This article addresses the idea that rational players should not play iteratively weakly dominated strategies by showing that when a particular type of adaptive learning process converges, then players must have learned to play strategy profiles equivalent to those that survive iterated nice weak dominance and, for certain games, equivalent to those that survive iterated weak dominance. For games satisfying the weak single crossing condition, the set of strategies that survive iterated weak dominance is small in that its bounds are pure strategy Nash equilibria. The results hold regardless of the order in which dominated strategies are eliminated. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.
INTRODUCTION
This article contributes to the literature on adaptive learning algorithms with the goal of showing how such learning procedures can lead players to select among the Nash equilibria of a game, in particular, to select strategies that survive the iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies.
Equilibrium analysis of games requires that players have beliefs about the play of their opponents and that players correctly predict the play of the game, but attention is not always given to the question of how players come to have such beliefs. One way in which this question was addressed was by considering a repeated game environment in which Bayesian players update priors in each period based on the observed history of play. For results on the convergence of play in such games, see, for example, Kalai and Lehrer (1993) , Fudenberg and Levine (1993) , Stanford (1991) , and Jordan (1991 Jordan ( , 1992 . Unfortunately, the Bayesian learning procedures of these articles sometimes place large informational and computational demands on the players and usually require a large degree of coordination among the players. Also, the learning procedures of these articles do not address the issue of selection among Nash equilibria.
Convergence results are also possible for simplistic players using more restrictive adaptive learning algorithms, e.g., Fudenberg and Kreps (1993) , Roberts (1990, 1991) , Lippman et al. (1987) . Although, the more restrictive adaptive learning algorithms reduce informational requirements on the players, these more simplistic learning procedures still do not address the issue of equilibrium selection.
In this article, I continue in the vein of the articles using restrictive adaptive learning algorithms but with the goal of showing how such learning procedures can lead players to select among the Nash equilibria of a game, in particular, to select strategies that survive iterated weak dominance. The results of this article characterize the limit of a type of adaptive learning process when the limit exists, but as in a number of previous articles, this article does not address requirements for convergence.
Weak Dominance
It is widely believed that players should not play strategies that are weakly dominated, and many normal form solution concepts deliver this, e.g., strategies played in a perfect equilibrium are not weakly dominated. Thus, it seems a natural extension of our assumed rationality of players to require that players should not play strategies that become weakly dominated once the weakly dominated strategies of their opponents are eliminated. Unfortunately, this is where the concept of weak dominance starts to run into trouble. Samuelson (1992) shows that common knowledge of rationality does not imply iterated weak dominance. 1 In addition, although the serially strongly undominated set is well defined, the set of strategies that survive iterated weak dominance can depend upon the order in which strategies are eliminated.
In order for players to learn to play only strategies that survive iterated weak dominance, it is necessary for players to view eliminated strategies as infinitely unlikely, and yet somehow not impossible. Furthermore, they must view strategies eliminated two rounds prior as infinitely less likely than strategies eliminated in the previous round. Obviously, in order to make these distinctions, players must have belief structures that are more complex than a single distribution over the strategy profiles of the opponents. For example, see Stahl (1995) , Battigalli (1996 Battigalli ( , 1997 , and Blume et al. (1991a Blume et al. ( , 1991b .
In this article, I propose a simple adaptive learning process that, when it converges, leads players to play only strategies that survive iterated weak dominance without the need for players to maintain complex belief systems and without the need for players to know the payoff functions of their opponents. The adaptive learning process I propose stays fairly close to previous work on adaptive learning processes with unsophisticated players. The results are for finite player, finite strategy normal form games, and they characterize the limit of the proposed adaptive learning process when the limit exists. 2 The limit of the proposed adaptive learning process is shown to be equivalent to an element of any set obtained by iteratively eliminating weakly dominated strategies (in any order). 3 
The Learning Process
The adaptive learning process that I define is similar to that defined by Milgrom and Roberts (1990) . A sequence of strategy profiles is an adaptive learning process if eventually all strategy choices can be justified in terms of not being weakly dominated given the history of play. In addition, I require that the process be robust to one-period changes in the (infinite) sequence of play, i.e., after changing the history for one period, it is still possible to let enough time pass so that players' strategy choices can again be justified given the history. In behavioral terms, this refinement can be viewed as a requirement that players be cautious in the sense that they consider the possibility of one-period errors in the reported (or remembered) history of play. I show that if play converges, the limit is, up to equivalence, in any set obtained by iterated nice weak dominance. Thus, this article addresses the idea that rational players should not play strategies that are weakly dominated or iteratively weakly dominated by showing that when a particular type of adaptive learning process converges, i.e., learning actually happens, then players in fact do not play such strategies. 2 The theory is substantially simplified when the strategy sets are finite, so I restrict attention to this case. The extension to infinite strategy sets would follow the constructions of Milgrom and Roberts (1991) .
3 Because the order of eliminations can matter under weak dominance and because the selection of not weakly dominated strategies in a subgame is not a monotonic operator, we must present results in terms of equivalence relations and we must employ different tactics (relative to the case with strong dominance) in order to prove the results.
Expanding the definition of adaptive learning to allow sequences of sets of strategies, the limit of a robust adaptive learning process is (up to redundant strategies) equivalent to a subset of any set obtained by iteratively eliminating nicely weakly dominated strategies, where nice weak dominance, defined in Marx and Swinkels (1997) , is similar to weak dominance but has an additional requirement. In order for a strategy for player i to be nicely weakly dominated by another, the strategy must be weakly dominated by the other and it must be that whenever there is a profile for the opponents such that the two strategies give player i the same payoff, then all players have the same payoff. 4 Additional results are possible for some special classes of games.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the definitions and notation required for the article. Section 3 introduces the type of adaptive learning that is considered in this article. Section 4 contains the main results and provides some discussion. Section 5 presents results for some special classes of games and contains a result on the size of the weakly undominated set for games satisfying a weak form of strategic complementarities. Section 6 provides some concluding remarks. The Appendix contains a description of a behavior rule resulting in play that is consistent with adaptive learning and one of the more tedious proofs.
NOTATION AND DEFINITIONS
In this section, I set out the definitions of the normal form game under consideration and of the domination relations to be used in the article. I restrict attention to normal form games = S i π i i∈N N , where the player set N is the finite set 1 2 n each strategy set S i is nonempty and finite, and each payoff function π i maps S ≡ S 1 × · · · × S n onto the real numbers.
I will frequently refer to the strategy space of various subgames of . For that purpose, I define a restriction of S to be a nonempty subset of S that can be represented as a cross product of subsets of the individual players' strategy sets.
If σ i is a mixed strategy for player i let σ i s i denote the probability that mixed strategy σ i associates with pure strategy s i . For restriction W let W i denote the set of mixtures over the pure strategies in
For a restriction W let W denote × i∈N W i , and for σ ∈ W use π i σ to mean the usual extension of the payoff function to mixed strategies.
There are three dominance relations that need to be defined, strong dominance, weak dominance, and nice weak dominance. We begin with strong dominance.
Definition 2. Let T be a restriction and let r i ∈ S i and σ i ∈ S i Then r i is strongly dominated on T by σ i if ∀s −i ∈ T −i π i σ i s −i > π i r i s −i .
Note that I allow pure strategies to be strongly dominated by either pure strategies or mixed strategies. If a restriction W can be obtained from S by iteratively eliminating strongly dominated strategies, and if ∀i ∈ N no strategy in W i is strongly dominated on W by a strategy in W i then refer to W as the serially strongly undominated set. Regardless of the order in which the eliminations are made, the serially strongly undominated set is uniquely defined.
Definition 3. Let T be a restriction and let r i ∈ S i and σ i ∈ S i Then r i is weakly dominated on T by σ i if ∀s −i ∈ T −i π i σ i s −i ≥ π i r i s −i , and for some r −i ∈ T −i π i σ i r −i > π i r i r −i .
Definition 4. Let T be a restriction and let r i ∈ S i and σ i ∈ S i . Then r i is nicely weakly dominated on T by σ i if r i is weakly dominated on T by σ i and if ∀s −i ∈ T , "π i σ i s −i = π i r i s −i ⇒ π σ i s −i = π r i s −i " It will also be useful to define redundant strategies. Note that in order for two strategies to be redundant, they must give all players the same payoff.
Definition 5. Let T be a restriction and let r i ∈ S i and σ i ∈ S i Then r i is redundant on T to σ i if ∀s −i ∈ T −i π σ i s −i = π r i s −i .
In what follows, I use the notation W U i T to denote the set of pure strategies for player i that are not weakly dominated on T by any strategy in S i . Thus, for any restriction T ,
The process of iterated (nice) weak dominance differs from iterated strong dominance in that the resulting set of strategy profiles is not necessarily unique. For any restriction T , say that T is a reduction by (nice) weak dominance if there exists some finite number of rounds of eliminations of sets of (nicely) weakly dominated strategies that results in T .
Definition 6. Let T be a restriction. Then T is a reduction by nice weak dominance if there exists a sequence of restrictions
\s i , and (iii) ∃k < ∞ such that ∀i ∈ N Sk i = T i .
The first condition in the above definition says that one must start with S and the third condition says that one must, after some finite number of rounds of eliminations, end up with T . The second conditions say each set S k i must be obtained from the previous set S . Note that the fact that T is a reduction by (nice) weak dominance does not imply that the elimination procedure is "done" in the sense that there are no more (nicely) weakly dominated strategies in T .
A restriction T is referred to as a full reduction by nice weak dominance if T is a reduction by (nice) weak dominance and if ∀i ∈ N no strategy in T i is (nicely) weakly dominated on T by a strategy in T i Although the serially strongly undominated set (a full reduction by strong dominance) is unique, there may be multiple full reductions by weak dominance and multiple full reductions by nice weak dominance.
For example, consider the game G1 in Fig. 1 . In this game there are no strongly dominated strategies, but three sequences of eliminations by weak dominance are possible. One can eliminate B and R in the first round, or one can eliminate only B in the first round, and then no more eliminations are possible, or one can eliminate R in the first round and then eliminate B in the second round. Depending upon the order of eliminations, the set of strategies that remains is either T × L or T × L R . Since R is not nicely weakly dominated on T B × L R , the only strategy that can be eliminated by nice weak dominance is B. So the unique full reduction by nice weak dominance is T × L R . Note that for this game, the two full reductions by weak dominance are both subsets of the unique full reduction by nice weak dominance. This is not always the case, but it is always true that any full reduction by weak dominance, after the elimination of redundant strategies, is equivalent to a subset of any reduction by nice weak dominance.
5
I only consider elimination procedures that eliminate pure strategies, so the dominance relations are only defined for dominance of a pure strategy by either a pure or a mixed strategy. In essence, I consider elimination procedures such that when a pure strategy is removed, so is every mixed strategy using that pure strategy. If a pure strategy s i for player i is weakly dominated on a restriction W , then every mixed strategy placing positive weight on s i is also weakly dominated on W so I view all as being eliminated together. However, as discussed in Marx and Swinkels (1997) , the result of iterated weak dominance depends only on the order of removal of pure strategies. Thus, it is this order to which I restrict attention.
ADAPTIVE LEARNING
I begin the discussion of adaptive learning by illustrating some ideas about learning and weak dominance with the simple game in Fig. 2 .
There are no strongly dominated strategies in game G2, so the entire strategy space is the serially strongly undominated set. However, eliminating weakly dominated strategies reduces the strategy space to B × R . If player 1's experience indicates to him that player 2 might choose R, then player 1 will rationally choose B. If player 2's experience indicates to her that player 1 might choose B, then player 2 will rationally choose R. In this sense, the players can learn not to play T or L, so that eventually the players always play B R .
To capture this type of learning more formally, define a sequence of pure strategy profiles x t , t = 0 1 2 to be consistent with adaptive learning for player i if ∀t ∃t >t ∀t ≥t x i t ∈ W U i × j∈N x j s t ≤ s < t
In words, this says that given any starting pointt player i can eventually justify his or her strategy choices sincet in terms of the competitors' past play and the "not weakly dominated" criterion. For periods after some timē t, player i must choose strategies that are not weakly dominated on the set of strategies played by the other players in the past by any mixture over strategies in S i . In particular, i's strategy in period t, where t ≥t must not be weakly dominated on x t x t − 1 . Takingt = 0, there exists t such that for all periods t ≥t player i's strategy must not be weakly dominated on the set t−1 t =0 x t , the set of all strategy profiles played prior to period t. Let x t be an adaptive learning sequence if it is consistent with adaptive learning.
The definition of consistency with adaptive learning used here is the same as that used in Milgrom and Roberts (1991) , with the exception that players are required to justify their choices as not weakly dominated rather than not strongly dominated. Players are assumed to use their information their opponents' past strategy choices to evaluate whether a particular strategy of theirs is weakly dominated.
If for all periods t ≥ t , the strategy profile played in period t is the same, say x * , then we can check for consistency with adaptive learning as follows: start with x i t and check that this strategy is not weakly dominated on x t , i.e., check that x i t is a best response to x −i t ; then check that x i t is not weakly dominated on any of the sets × j∈N x j t − 1 x j t × j∈N x j 0 x j t . If these conditions are satisfied, then x t is consistent with adaptive learning. Conversely, if x t is an adaptive learning sequence with x t = x * for all t ≥ t then for all t > t x * i is not weakly dominated on x t − 1 or on x t − 2 x t − 1 or on x t − 3 x t − 2 x t − 1 or on x 0 x t − 1 To see this, note that if it does not hold and k is the smallest integer such that x * i is weakly dominated on x t − k x t − 1 then whent = t − k there is not satisfying the consistency definition. Thus, in this case, consistency with adaptive learning requires that eventually players avoid strategies that are weakly dominated on the set of strategies played in the previous period and the previous two periods and the previous three periods, etc. In this way, more recent history carries more weight because the strategy profile played, say, three periods prior is never considered in isolation; it is only considered in the context of the strategies that came after it. In this sense, strategies for the opponents are never completely eliminated but their impact is diluted over time by strategies that come later.
The "iterated best response" behavior rule defined in the Appendix is an example of a behavior rule that generates a sequence of play that is consistent with adaptive learning. Players using that behavior rule choose strategies that are best responses to their opponents' previous strategy profile. If there is more than one best response, players evaluate the one-period best responses as responses to their opponents' strategies two periods prior. If multiple strategies still remain, the selection process continues using earlier histories to select from among the remaining set of strategies.
Convergence
Clearly, any sequence of strategy profiles that converges to a strict Nash equilibrium is consistent with adaptive learning since, regardless of the history, strict Nash equilibrium strategies cannot be weakly dominated on the set of strategies played in the past. 6 However, a sequence of strategy profiles converging to a Nash equilibrium that is not strict need not be consistent with adaptive learning. For example, in game G2 the sequence x t with x 1 = B L , and x t = T L for all t ≥ 2 converges to T L , which is a Nash equilibrium, but for all t ≥ 2, x 2 t = L is weakly dominated given the full history of past plays by player 1, which includes B. So consistency with adaptive learning eliminates as plausible outcomes some Nash equilibria that use weakly dominated strategies, but no strict Nash equilibria.
On the other hand, if an adaptive learning sequence converges to a single strategy profile, then its limit must be a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. This result corresponds to similar results obtained elsewhere in the literature-see Fudenberg and Levine (1993) , Jordan (1991 Jordan ( , 1992 , and Kalai and Lehrer (1993) , Canning (1992) , Roberts (1990, 1991) , and Fudenberg and Kreps (1993) .
However, it is not the case that the limit of a convergent adaptive learning process is an element of any given reduction by weak dominance or even an element of any given reduction by nice weak dominance. Consider the sequence of strategies for game G2, where for all t, z t = T L . Because T is not weakly dominated on T × L and L is not weakly dominated on T × L , this sequence is consistent with adaptive learning. Furthermore, since the payoff vector for T L is 1 1 and the payoff vector for B R , which is the only profile in the unique full reduction by nice weak dominance, is 2 1 , the profile T L is clearly not equivalent to a strategy profile in the full reduction by nice weak dominance. However, the sequence of strategy profiles z t has the property that if we add B or R to the history at any point, then the sequence is no longer consistent with adaptive learning. The sequence z t , all of whose elements are equal to T L is not robust to this type of change. If just one strategy profile in the sequence is changed, then it is no longer consistent with adaptive learning.
However, as mentioned in the introduction, I use a robustness refinement that requires an adaptive learning sequence not to be so fragile that changing of one element in the sequence results in its no longer being consistent with adaptive learning. This has the behavioral interpretation that players consider the possibility of errors in the reported (or remembered) history of play. In this setting, a cautious adaptive learner who applies the not weakly dominated criterion would first determine the set of strategies that are not weakly dominated given the history and then choose from these strategies based on robustness to mistakes in the player's information about the history of play. In other words, players subject candidate strategies to the following test: do not choose a strategy s i if there existt in the past and strategy profilex such that s i no longer satisfies the not weakly dominated criterion for the history constructed by replacing x t withx. It seems reasonable that a player who is trying to learn from the history of play and to make a choice that has the best chance of being a best response in the next period should select strategies that are robust to small changes in his or her information or beliefs about the history of play.
The robustness refinement of consistency with adaptive learning is related to a requirement that there be sufficient experimentation by the players. In fact, the analysis of this article can also be viewed in terms of experimentation-see Marx (1994) .
7 If the history of play is not sufficiently "rich," then adaptive learning need not lead players to choose strategies that survive iterated weak dominance. We can also relate adaptive learning and robustness to the concepts of admissibility and stability (see Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986) . Strategies that are not admissible can be limits of an adaptive learning sequence; however, they cannot be limits of a robust adaptive learning sequence. Thus, robust adaptive learning leads players to choose admissible strategies. Robust adaptive learning also leads players to choose strategies that are stable. To see this, suppose z t is a robust adaptive learning sequence with limit z * and suppose z * is not stable. Then there exist i ∈ N z i ∈ S i and perturbed strategies ζ −i ∈ × j =i S j such that π i z i ζ −i < π i z i ζ −i which implies the existence of x −i ∈ S −i such that π i z i x −i < π i z i x −i contradicting the robustness of z t
Sequences of Sets
Behavior rules based on dominance arguments typically predict a set of strategies as the final outcome rather than a single strategy profile. This type of set-valued solution concept can be useful in some settings as it al-7 Experimentation by players is important for the convergence results of Fudenberg and Kreps (1993) and Kalai and Lehrer (1993) . Canning (1992) uses a related approach in which players are viewed as making mistakes. lows various interpretations, some of which are discussed below. To allow this generality, I expand the view of the dynamic learning process to allow histories of sets of strategy profiles rather than just histories of single strategy profiles, although the results apply equally to sequences of individual strategy profiles. I view the history of play as a sequence of restrictions Z t This formulation allows several possible interpretations. For example, suppose that players select mixed strategies. Then the set of strategies that are not weakly dominated on the previous period's mixed strategy profile is a subset of the set of strategies that are not weakly dominated on the support of the mixed strategy profile. So for the purposes of avoiding weakly dominated strategies, the only information required about a mixed strategy is its support. Histories that are sequences of sets can also be interpreted as many individuals playing the role of each of the n player types, with the players observing the set of all strategies that were played after each round. Or the histories can be interpreted as players not having exact information about their opponents' strategies choices but rather learning only a set of strategies from which the opponents' choices were made.
The definitions of consistency with adaptive learning and robustness are presented below. In the remainder of this article, histories are viewed as set-valued and the definition of consistency with adaptive learning is as given below. The definition of the robustness of an adaptive learning sequence, requires that the sequence still be consistent with adaptive learning if one element of the sequence is changed.
Definition 8. Let Z t be an adaptive learning sequence. Then Z t is robust if for all restrictionsẐ and for all t , the sequence obtained from Z t by replacing Z t withẐ is also an adaptive learning sequence.
MAIN RESULTS
In this section I show that the limit of a robust adaptive learning sequence, after the removal of redundant strategies, is equivalent to a subset of any reduction by nice weak dominance. This provides bounds on the outcome of a robust adaptive learning process. If the limit is a single strategy profile, then the limit is a Nash equilibrium and is an element of any reduction by weak dominance. In this case, players learn to play one of the Nash equilibria that survives the iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies. In Section 5, I show that for certain games, these bounds can be refined even further.
Definition 9. Let V and W be restrictions. Then V is said to be equivalent to a subset of W if ∀i ∈ N there exist one-to-one maps m i V i → W i such that ∀s ∈ V , π s = π m 1 s 1 m n s n .
We can now state the main result. Discussion of Proposition 1 is given below and the proof follows. Proposition 1. Let W be a reduction by nice weak dominance and let Z t be a robust adaptive learning sequence such that Z t → Z * . Then Z * after the removal of redundant strategies, is equivalent to a subset of W .
Proposition 1 states that if a robust adaptive learning sequence converges, then players eventually learn to play a set of strategies that is, up to redundant strategies, equivalent to a subset of any reduction by nice weak dominance. Since any full reduction by nice weak dominance is a subset of the serially strongly undominated set, this result provides a more precise prediction on the outcome of successful adaptive learning sequences than is possible for learning processes based on strong dominance. For example, in game G2, Proposition 1 implies that in any convergent robust adaptive learning sequence, players learn to play B R since B × R is the unique full reduction by nice weak dominance. The restriction B × R is a strict subset of the strongly undominated set.
However, as another example, consider game G3 shown in Fig. 3 . In game G3 the unique full reduction by nice weak dominance is b × L (eliminate m, R, M, t), and since any full reduction by weak dominance is equivalent to a subset of any reduction by nice weak dominance (see Marx and Swinkels, 1997) , b × L is the unique full reduction by weak dominance. Proposition 1 implies that players learn to play b L , giving a finer prediction on the outcome of learning than some other solution or equilibrium concepts. For instance, the serially strongly undominated set is the entire game, and there are three pure-strategy Nash equilibrium profiles, t R , m R , and b L . In order to prove Proposition 1, I use the definition of a stable restriction and a lemma, which are given below.
Definition 10. Let Z and W be restrictions with Z ⊆ W . Then Z is a stable restriction of W if ∀i ∈ N ∀w ∈ W no strategy in Z i is weakly dominated on × j∈N Z j ∪ w j by a strategy in W i .
In particular, taking w ∈ Z in the definition above, if Z is a stable restriction of W then no element of Z i is weakly dominated on Z by a strategy in W i .
Lemma 1 below shows that if Z is a stable restriction of S, then Z, after the removal of redundant strategies, is equivalent to a subset of W where W is any reduction by nice weak dominance. 8 In particular, any stable restriction payoff vector is a payoff vector in every full reduction by nice weak dominance. The proof is a bit tedious and so is placed in the Appendix, but I try to give a bit of intuition here. The argument follows by induction: Start with Z and remove strategies one at a time in the order they were removed in the elimination process that led to W , resulting in the sequenceẐ 1 Ẑ m . Note that the elimination process leading to W does not necessarily involve only one-at-a-time eliminations, so if several strategies are eliminated in one round, then put those strategies in any order. Let w k be the strategy removed in moving fromẐ k−1 toẐ k Now construct a new sequence Z 1 Z m equal toẐ 1 Ẑ m except that if the strategy that weakly dominated w k is not inẐ k−1 then add the pure strategies from which the dominating strategy is constructed to Z k . We show that w k is redundant on W k−1 (the strategies remaining when w k was eliminated in the process leading to W ) to a strategy in Z k This allows us to show that Z after the elimination of redundant strategies, is equivalent to a subset of Z m which is by construction a subset of W
Lemma 1. Let W be a reduction by nice weak dominance. If Z is a stable restriction of S, then Z, after the removal of redundant strategies, is equivalent to a subset of W .
Proof of Proposition 1. Since Z t is consistent with adaptive learning, ∀i ∈ N no strategy in Z * i is weakly dominated on Z * by a strategy in S * i . Since Z t is robust, ∀i ∈ N ∀y ∈ S no strategy in Z * i is weakly dominated on × j∈N Z * j ∪ y j by a strategy in S * i . Therefore, Z * is a stable restriction of S. The remainder of the proof follows from Lemma 1.
An additional result is possible if the limit Z * is a single strategy profile, z * . In this case, the fact that Z t is a robust adaptive learning sequence implies that z * is an element of any reduction by weak dominance, i.e., z * is not eliminated in any order of eliminations by weak dominance.
Proposition 2. Let Z t be a robust adaptive learning sequence such that Z t → z where z ∈ S and let T be a reduction by weak dominance. Then z ∈ T Proof. Let Z t and T be as in the proposition, and let S k ∞ k=0 be as in Definition 6. Since Z t → z ∃t such that Z t = z for all t ≥ t Suppose z / ∈ T Then there exists k ∈ 1 2 and i ∈ N such that z ∈ S k−1
and z i is weakly dominated on S k−1 by σ i ∈ S k−1 i \z i Then π i σ i z −i ≥ π i z i z −i and ∃s ∈ S k−1 such that π i σ i s −i > π i z i s −i Define the sequence Z t by Z t ≡ Z t for t < t Z t ≡ s and Z t ≡ z for t > t Sequence Z t is not consistent with adaptive learning since z i is weakly dominated on × j∈N z j ∪ s j Thus, Z t is not robust, a contradiction.
RESULTS FOR SPECIAL GAMES
Additional results are possible for two special types of games, those that satisfy the "Transference of Decision Maker Indifference" or TDI condition and those that satisfy the weak single crossing condition. 9 In games satisfying TDI, nice weak dominance and weak dominance are equivalent, so Proposition 1 implies that the limit of a robust adaptive learning sequence, after removal of redundant strategies, is equivalent to a subset of any reduction by weak dominance (see Proposition 3). For games satisfying the weak single crossing condition, a weaker condition than strategic complementarities, any full reduction by weak dominance is small in the sense that its bounds, if they exist, are pure-strategy Nash equilibrium profiles. Thus, TDI and weak single crossing imply that the limit of a robust adaptive learning sequence is equivalent to a subset of the set bounded by the smallest and the largest pure-strategy Nash equilibria. If the game also has a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, then all limit payoff vectors are the same as the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium payoff vector.
I first define the two conditions and describe games satisfying those conditions and then state the results. The definition of TDI refers to the term "very weakly dominated." For σ i ∈ W i \s i a strategy s i is very weakly dominated on W by σ i if ∀w −i ∈ W −i , π i σ i w −i ≥ π i s i w −i . In other words, very weak dominance is weak dominance without the requirement that there be a strict inequality.
Definition 11. Game satisfies TDI if for all restrictions W ∀i ∈ N and ∀s i ∈ S i , if s i is very weakly dominated on W by σ i ∈ S i \s i , then ∃σ i ∈ S i \s i such that either s i is weakly dominated on W by σ i or s i is redundant on W to σ i .
If a game satisfies TDI, then whenever player i is indifferent between strategies s i and σ i , fixing the profile of opponents' strategies s −i , either all players are indifferent between profiles s i s −i and σ i s −i or there is some strategy σ i such that i strictly prefers σ i over s i and σ i given s −i In effect, if the indifference for player i is "necessary," then player i's indifference is "transferred" to all the players.
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TDI holds in games in which one player cannot affect the payoff of another player without affecting his own payoff. For example, suppose players choose effort on an exam and receive a payoff based on the ranking of their exam score. Given a vector of effort levels for the players and assuming players cannot sabotage other players' exams, then the only way one player can affect the payoff of another player is by choosing an effort level that changes the order of the two players' score, thus affecting both players' payoffs. Many games have the property that one player cannot directly affect the performance of another player, but can only affect the payoff of another player by changing how the players compare, thereby affecting the payoff of both players. More generally, TDI is commonly satisfied in classes in which payoffs are utilities of "outcomes" and in which different choices by one player can lead to identical outcomes given the other players' strategies.
A game with partially ordered strategy sets satisfies weak single crossing if whenever player i strictly prefers a larger pure strategy over a smaller one, then player i continues to at least weakly prefer the larger pure strategy over the smaller one when his or her opponents play a larger strategy profile. There are a number of examples of games that satisfy TDI and weak single crossing. A discretized version of the first price auction satisfies both TDI and weak single crossing, as do Bertrand models with homogeneous products. The second price auction satisfies weak single crossing but not TDI, and certain group formation games satisfy TDI but not weak single crossing. More details on these games and additional examples of games that satisfy TDI are in Marx and Swinkels (1997) .
Proposition 3 states that for games satisfying TDI, the limit of a robust adaptive learning sequence, after removal of redundant strategies, is not only equivalent to a subset of any reduction by nice weak dominance, but also equivalent to a subset of any reduction by weak dominance. The proof of this proposition follows directly from Proposition 1 and the equivalence of nice weak dominance and weak dominance in games satisfying TDI.
Proposition 3. Let satisfy TDI and let W be a reduction by weak dominance. Let Z t be a robust adaptive learning sequence such that Z t → Z * . Then Z * , after the removal of redundant strategies, is equivalent to a subset of W . Milgrom and Roberts (1991) show that in games with strategic complementarities, the upper and lower bounds of the serially strongly undominated set are pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Proposition 4 shows that in games satisfying the weak single crossing property, the upper and lower bounds of the weakly undominated set (when they exist) are pure-strategy Nash equilibria. The proof of Proposition 4 uses the following lemma, which is Lemma B* of Marx and Swinkels (1997) and so is not proved here. It states that if s i is eliminated in the process of iterated (nice) very weak dominance, then s i is (nicely) very weakly dominated on the set of remaining strategy profiles by a mixture over remaining strategies.
Lemma 2. Let W be a reduction by (nice) very weak dominance and let s i ∈ S i \W i . Then there exists τ i ∈ W i such that τ i (nicely) very weakly dominates s i on W .
Proof of Proposition 4. Letx be the largest element of W . Suppose that x is not a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. Then for some player j there existsx j such that π j x j x −j > π j x j x −j . Supposex j ∈ W j Since W is a full reduction by weak dominance, ∃x −j ∈ W −j such that π j x j x −j < π j x j x −j Sincex j ≥x j and sincex −j ≥x −j by weak single crossing π j x j x −j ≤ π j x j x −j a contradiction. Thus,x j ∈ S j \W j Applying Lemma 2, ∃σ j ∈ W j such that π j σ j x −j > π j x j x −j . In particular, ∃x * j ∈ W j \x j such that π j x * j x −j > π j x j x −j . Since x * j ≤x j , weak single crossing implies that for all x −j ≤x −j , π j x * j x −j ≥ π j x j x −j . But then x j is weakly dominated on W by x * j , a contradiction. A similar argument holds for the smallest element of W .
Note that Proposition 4 has power only if the full reduction by weak dominance actually has a smallest or a largest element. Milgrom and Roberts (1991) show that in games with strategic complementarities the serially strongly undominated set does in fact have smallest and largest elements. However, even in games with strategic complementarities, a full reduction by weak dominance need not have a smallest or a largest element. For example, consider the game in Fig. 4 .
Suppose that the strategies of game G4 are ordered as follows: L < R; B < M M < T; and M and M not comparable. Then game G4 has strategic complementarities and the entire game is the serially strongly undominated set. The smallest and the largest strategy profiles, B L and T R , are pure-strategy Nash equilibrium profiles. However, T M M × L R is a full reduction by weak dominance and has no smallest element. On the other hand, if the strategy sets are fully ordered (and finite), then clearly any reduction by weak dominance does have smallest and largest elements.
For games that satisfy both TDI and weak single crossing, we can get even finer predictions on the limit of an adaptive learning sequence. Suppose that satisfies TDI and weak single crossing and that S is a fully ordered set.
11 If a robust adaptive learning sequence Z t converges to Z * , then we 11 The set S need not be fully ordered as long as has smallest and largest pure-strategy Nash equilibria and the reduction by weak dominance under consideration has smallest and largest elements. know by Proposition 3 that Z * after the removal of redundant strategies, is equivalent to a subset of any reduction by weak dominance. But since the game satisfies weak single crossing, we also know that Z * after the removal of redundant strategies, is equivalent to a subset of the set bounded by the smallest and the largest pure-strategy Nash equilibria of . If the game has a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium y, then Z * after the removal of redundant strategies, must be equivalent to a subset of y . This can only hold if all strategy profiles in Z * have payoff vector π y In Section 3 it was mentioned that any sequence of single strategy profiles that converges to a strict Nash equilibrium is consistent with adaptive learning. However, as the final result of this section, I show an analogous result for sequences of restrictions for games that satisfy TDI. In particular, I show that in games satisfying TDI, any sequence of restrictions that converges to a stable restriction is consistent with adaptive learning. In a sense, in games satisfying TDI, a stable restriction acts as the set-valued counterpart to a strict Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 5. Let satisfy TDI and let Z t be a sequence of restrictions that converges to a stable restriction of S Z
* . Then Z t is consistent with adaptive learning.
Proof. Let W be a restriction such that Z * ⊆ W . Let i ∈ N z i ∈ Z * i and σ i ∈ S i . Suppose that z i is weakly dominated on W by σ i . Then there exists w ∈ W such that π i σ i w −i > π i z i w −i and, since Z * ⊆ W z i is very weakly dominated on Z * by σ i . But then z i is weakly dominated on × j∈N Z * j ∪ w j by σ i , a contradiction of Z * being a stable restriction of S. Thus, ∀i ∈ N, no strategy in Z * i is weakly dominated on W by a strategy in S i .
Lett be such that ∀t ≥t, Z t = Z * . For t ≤t, let W t = × j∈N s∈ t t Z j s and for t >t let W t = Z * . Note that for all t, Z * ⊆ W t . By the previous argument, ∀t ∀i ∈ N, no strategy in Z * i is weakly dominated on W t by a strategy in S i . Therefore, ∀t ∀i ∈ N, ∀z i ∈ Z * i , z i is not weakly dominated on W t by a strategy in S i , and so the sequence Z t is consistent with adaptive learning.
CONCLUSION
This article attempts to motivate the solution concepts of iterated weak dominance and iterated nice weak dominance as the outcomes of an adaptive learning process. This work helps us to justify the use of these solution concepts by appealing to a learning story. To the extent that the existence of a learning interpretation reinforces the validity of a solution concept for a finite normal form game, this article provides support for use of iterated dominance using the dominance relations of weak dominance and nice weak dominance.
Specifically, this article shows that the limit of a convergent robust adaptive learning sequence, after the removal of redundant strategies, is equivalent to a subset of any set obtained by iterated nice weak dominance. If the limit is a single strategy profile, then it survives any order of eliminations by weak dominance. Additional results are provided for games satisfying the TDI and weak single crossing conditions.
APPENDIX

Iterated Best Response Behavior Rule
What follows is an example of a behavior rule, the iterated best response rule, which determines play in each period based on the history of past plays. At t = 0, players arbitrarily select strategies, resulting in profile x 0 . In periods t ≥ 1, players first determine the set of best responses to the strategy profile used by their opponents in the previous period. If this set of best responses has more than one element, players determine the subset of these best responses that do the best against the strategy profile used by their opponents two periods prior. If multiple strategies still remain, players continue to eliminate pure strategies that are inferior against the strategy profiles for their opponents in progressively earlier periods. Each player continues this process until he or she has either selected a single strategy or reached time zero, in which case he or she plays a mixture over the remaining pure strategies (in which case only the pure strategy actually played enters the history of play).
This process is formally defined as follows: For t ≥ 1, define
and for k = 2 3 and t ≥ k, define Proof. Consider x t generated by the iterated best response behavior rule. Then
Thus, x i t is not weakly dominated on x t − 1 by any element of S i and x i t is not weakly dominated on any restriction containing x t − 1 by any element of S i \B 1 i t . Define P k to be the statement: All elements of B k i t give player i the same payoff against x t − 1 x t − 2 and x t − k , and x i t is not weakly dominated on any restriction containing × j∈N s=1 k x j t − s by any element of
Thus x i t is not weakly dominated on × j∈N s=1 k+1 x j t − s by any element of S i .
By induction, x i t is not weakly dominated on × j∈N s=1 k x j t − s for k = 1 t by any element of S i Since i and t were chosen arbitrarily, this implies that the sequence x t is consistent with adaptive learning.
Proof of Lemma 1. We begin the proof of Lemma 1 with a definition and two lemmas. Lemma 3, is Lemma A* of Marx and Swinkels (1997) , and so it is not proved here.
To conserve on notation somewhat, assume that the strategy labels for all players are distinct, i.e., ∀i j ∈ N, i = j, S i ∩ S j = . Then for a strategy s for some player, we can use S i \s to denote the set of strategies for player i other than s. If s does not belong to player i, then S i \s is just equal to S i . For a restriction W , the set × i∈N W i \s is the restriction in which all players have strategy sets as in W except the player to whom s belongs, and that player has the strategy set as in W but with s removed. Given a strategy s for some player, we use the notation ι s to denote the player to whom s belongs. For restriction W and s ∈ S let W ∪ s denote the restriction × j∈N W j ∪ s j Definition 13. Let T be a restriction and let r i ∈ S i and σ i ∈ S i . Then r i is very weakly dominated on T by σ i if ∀s −i ∈ T −i , π i σ i s −i ≥ π i r i s −i . The very weak dominance is nice if in addition π i σ i s −i = π i r i s −i ⇒ π σ i s −i = π r i s −i . 
with a strict inequality for some element of Z k+1 ∪ ŵ Since, by P k t j is not weakly dominated on Z k ∪ ŵ ∃ŝ ∈ Z k+1 ∪ ŵ such that π j τ j w k+1 ŝ −j < π j t j w k+1 ŝ −j
Since w k+1 is redundant on W k to σ k+1 (2) implies that π j τ j σ k+1 ŝ −j < π j t j σ k+1 ŝ −j
Since σ k+1 ∈ Z k+1 , (1) implies that ∀s ∈ Z k+1 ∪ ŵ ∀q ∈ s ∈ Z k+1 σ k+1 s > 0 π j τ j q s −j ≥ π j t j q s −j which contradicts (3). Therefore, ∀j ∈ N ∀w ∈ W k+1 , no element of Z k+1 j is weakly dominated on Z k+1 ∪ w by an element of W k+1 j
Letting w ∈ Z k+1 we have also shown that ∀j ∈ N no element of Z and for some t ∈ s ∈ W k+1 σ k+1 s > 0 t is weakly dominated on Z k+1 ∪ ŵ by τ ∈ W k+1 Define the mixed strategyσ for player by letting the weight placed on strategy s, for all s ∈ W k+1 , be given bŷ σ s ≡ σ k+1 s + σ k+1 t · τ s s = t σ k+1 t · τ t s = t
Since w k+1 is redundant on W k to σ k+1 and since Z k+1 ∪ ŵ is a subset of W k ∀r ∈ Z k+1 ∪ ŵ π w k+1 r − = π σ k+1 r − Since t is weakly dominated on Z k+1 ∪ ŵ by τ ∀r ∈ Z k+1 ∪ ŵ π τ r − ≥ π t r −
and for somer ∈ Z k+1 ∪ ŵ this inequality is strict. Thus, ∀r ∈ Z k+1 ∪ ŵ where the first equality uses (4), the inequality uses (5), and the last equality uses Part I. For somer the inequality is strict. This implies that w k+1 is weakly dominated on Z k+1 ∪ ŵ and thus on Z k ∪ ŵ byσ which contradicts P k Therefore, ∀w ∈ W k+1 no element of Z k+1 is weakly dominated on Z k+1 or on Z k+1 ∪ w by an element of W k+1
Let j = Suppose ∃ŵ ∈ W k+1 and ∃ẑ j ∈ Z k+1 j = Z k j such thatẑ j is weakly dominated on Z k+1 ∪ ŵ byσ j ∈ W k+1 j = W k j
Then ∀s ∈ Z k+1 ∪ ŵ π j σ j s −j ≥ π j ẑ j s −j (6) with a strict inequality for someŝ ∈ Z k+1 ∪ ŵ In particular, (6) implies that ∀q ∈ s ∈ W k+1 σ k+1 s > 0 π j σ j q ŝ −j ≥ π j ẑ j q ŝ −j
Note that s ∈ W k+1 σ k+1 s > 0 is a subset of Z k+1 . By P k ẑ j is not weakly dominated on Z k ∪ ŵ byσ j so since Z k+1 ∪ ŵ differs from Z k ∪ ŵ in that the former does not contain w k+1 and does contain additional strategies, either (i) π j σ j w k+1 ŝ −j < π j ẑ j w k+1 ŝ −j or (ii)ŝ / ∈ Z k ∪ ŵ Case (i). In this case, since w k+1 is redundant on W k to σ k+1 by Part I, then π j σ j σ k+1 ŝ −j < π j ẑ j σ k+1 ŝ −j which contradicts (7).
Case (ii). In this case, ∃q ∈ s ∈ W k+1 σ k+1 s > 0 such thatq is the th component ofŝ and π j σ j q ŝ −j > π j ẑ j q ŝ −j This inequality together with (7) implies that π j σ j σ k+1 ŝ −j > π j ẑ j σ k+1 ŝ −j which by Part I implies that π j σ j w k+1 ŝ −j > π j ẑ j w k+1 ŝ −j
Equation (8) together with (6) implies thatẑ j is weakly dominated on Z k ∪ ŵ byσ j contradicting P k . Therefore, ∀j ∈ N ∀w ∈ W k+1 , no element of Z k+1 j is weakly dominated on Z k+1 ∪ w by an element of W k+1 j
Letting w be an element of Z k+1
we have shown that no element of Z k+1 j where the first equality uses (9), (10), and the facts thatσ Then for all s ∈ Z π m 1 s 1 m n s n = π s If there exist distinct strategies s i s i ∈ Z i such that m i s i = m i s i then s i and s i are redundant on Z Thus, by deleting for all i ∈ N strategies in Z i that are redundant on Z we obtainẐ i such that m i is one-to-one when restricted toẐ i Therefore, Z after removal of redundant strategies, is equivalent to a subset of Z m which is a subset of W m = W
